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NOTE
PERSONAL JURISDICT[ON IN INNESOTA
OVER ABSENT DEFENDANTS
Since the beginning of this century the power of a state to render
an in personam judgment against an absent defendant has been
continually expanded. As modern methods of transportation and
communication have broken down geographical barriers, the courts
and legislatures have gradually broken down state jurisdictional
barriers.
The most recent development has been the enactment of so-
called isolated or single act statutes in several states. In 1957,
Minnesota became the sixth state to enact a statute of this type.'
Under the Minnesota act, a personal judgment may be entered
against a foreign corporation in either a tort or contract action
when the corporation's only contact with the state was a single
transaction or occurrence. This statute makes a considerable change
in the "minimum contacts" required before a court may assert
jurisdiction. Further, it changes the method of service by authoriz-
ing process to be served on the Secretary of State in an action
against any foreign corporation. Previously, if a corporation had
not qualified to "do business" in Minnesota, it was necessary to
locate an agent of the corporation within the state in order to serve
process.2 In view of these two changes, the statute is certain to have
an important effect on Minnesota practice.
The United States Supreme Court has never directly passed
on the constitutionality of such a statute and, therefore, the primary
emphasis of this Note will be on the constitutional questions in-
volved. Although the Minnesota isolated act statute applies only to
corporations, many of the problems raised are equally applicable to
partnerships and individuals. Thus, the question of whether a
statute covering these two classifications would be constitutional
and if so, whether such a statute would be desirable, will also be
considered.
1. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1957). The other states having
single act statutes are Illinois, Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956),
Maryland, Md. Ann. Code, art. 23, § 88(d) (1951), N.orth Carolina, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 55-145(a), (a) (4) (Supp. 1955), Vermont, Vt. Rev. Stat. § 1562
(1947), and West Virginia, W.Va. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 20, art. 1, § 71. Ar-
kansas and Mississippi have identical statutes which are broad enough to cover
the single act situation but in neither state has such an interpretation been
clearly made. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-340 (1947); Miss. Code Ann. § 1437
(1942).
2. See Minn. Stat Ann. § 543.08 (1949); Minn. R. Cir. P. 4.03(c);
Wright, Minnesota Rules 22-23 (1954).
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I. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
The Minnesota single act statute provides:
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of
Minnesota to be performed in whole or in part by either party
in Minnesota, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort
in whole or in part in Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota,
such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Minnesota by
the foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the
appointment by the foreign corporation of the secretary of the
State of Minnesota... to be its true and lawful attorney upon
upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions or
proceedings against the foreign corporation arising from or
growing out of such contract or tort.3
This statute presents two constitutional questions of due process
under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
The first is whether a state has the power to render a valid judg-
ment and the second is whether the provisions for notice to the de-
fendant are adequate. The former is by far the most complex and
consequently will receive the most attention.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW PRIOR TO INTERNATIONAL SHOE
A fundamental change in the basis upon which a state court
may assert jurisdiction was made in 1945 by the decision of the
United State Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington.4 Because of this change only a brief summary of the develop-
of the law prior to that case will be given.5
At common law a personal judgment against a foreign corpo-
ration could not be rendered unless the corporation voluntarily sub-
mitted to the jurisdiction of the court.6 As corporate activity in-
creased, this rule became unworkable and the theory was developed
that a state had the power to require a foreign corporation doing
business within the state to appoint an agent upon whom service of
process could be made.7 The rationale on which this theory was
based was that since a state could forbid a corporation from doing
business within its boundaries," it had the power to require the
3. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1957). The statute also makes
provision for giving notice of the action to defendant. This problem will be
discussed later in the text.
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. For a detailed discussion of this subject see Foster, Personal uris-
diction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 522, 527-39; Scott,
Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 871, 880-84 (1919).
6. See, e.g., Peckham v. North Parish in Haverhill, 16 Pick. 274 (Mass.
1834).
7. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Mill-
ing Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
8. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 168 (1868).
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appointment of an agent as a condition precedent to allowing the
corporation to enter the state. Because a corporation might avoid the
effect of this rule by refusing to appoint an agent, a doctrine based
on a fictional consent was developed. If a corporation did certain
acts within a state the corporation was deemed to have "impliedly
consented" to be sued thereY
A second theory used to subject a corporation to a state's juris-
diction was based on the concept of "presence." The theory was
that a personal judgment against a foreign corporation could be
entered "only if it is doing business within the State in such manner
and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present
there." 0 Relying on either the "consent" or "presence" theories, a
large body of case law gradually developed dealing with what types
of transactions constituted "doing business.""
Although the "doing business" concept was gradually expanded,
the general rule remained that a single, isolated contact was in-
sufficient to allow a personal judgment to be entered against a
foreign corporation.12 However, quite early it was held that a single
act might constitute a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over an indi-
vidual. In Hess v. Pawloski, 13 the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Massachusetts Nonresident Motorist Statute."
This statute provided that service of process could be made on a
nonresident motorist by serving the State Registrar in any action
arising out of the negligent operation of an automobile in Massa-
chusetts. The Court reasoned that motor vehicles are dangerous
machines and that the state, in the exercise of its police power,
could make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to pro-
mote safety on its highways.
The police-power rationale of Hess was applied in Doherty &
Co. v. Goodman, '5 to allow service on a nonresident partnership
engaged in the business of selling corporate securities within the
state of Iowa. Prior to this case a state could not validly assert
jurisdiction over a nonresident partnership because of the Supreme
9. E.g., Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909);
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
10. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
11. See 49 A.L.R.2d 669, n.5 (1956), for a list of annotations regarding
the various aspects of what constitutes "doing business."
12. See Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516(1923); State ex rel. Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 209 Wis. 476,
478, 245 N.W. 194, 195 (1932) ; Haunau v. Northern Region Supply Corp.,
262 Fed. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
13. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
14. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90, § 3A (1954).
15. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
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Court's refusal to apply the "implied consent" theory to partner-
ships." However, in Doherty the Court reasoned that since the
state had an extremely strong interest in regulating the sale of
corporate securities it could assert jurisdiction.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE DOCTRINE
In the International Shoe case, the defandant, a Delaware
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
shoes, had its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. It
maintained no office in Washington but did employ from eleven
to thirteen salesmen who resided and solicited orders in that state.
The salesmen had no authority to enter into contracts or to make
collections but would merely forward orders to St. Louis where
they would be accepted or rejected. The defendant failed to make
payments to the Washington unemployment fund and a notice of
deficiency was given by service on one of its agents in that state.
Defendant contended that since it was not doing business within the
state, the court had not acquired personal jurisdiction. The Wash-
ington court rejected this contention and affirmed a judgment for
the plaintiff.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court discarded both
the fictions of corporate presence and implied consent as proper
bases of jurisdiction. 7 It substituted a new test based on reasonable-
ness and fairness.18
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 19
The Court indicated that the demands of due process may be met
"by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of govern-
ment, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which
is brought there. An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would
result to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or prin-
cipal place of business is relevant in this connection." 2 0 The Court
then attempted to define more precisely the limitations of due process:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a
16. See Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
17. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
See 26 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 713, 714 (1951).
18. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 216 (3d ed. 1949).
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
20. Id. at 317.
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corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative.... Whether due process is satisfied
must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity
in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.21
In discussing the question of the isolated act the Court stated:
[A] lthough the commission of some single or occasional acts of
of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation
or liability on the corporation has not been thought to confer
upon the state authority to enforce it, . . other such acts, be-
cause of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their
commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation
liable to suit.22
In support of the latter part of this quotation the Court cited Hess
and two other cases based on the police-power doctrine. This alone
would appear to support the conclusion that a state may validly
assert jurisdiction based on an isolated act only in exceptional cases,
where the state has a peculiar interest in regulating the particular
conduct of the nonresident.23 However, previously in the opinion
the Court had stated that "it has been generally recognized that the
casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single
or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf
are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected
with the activities there." 24 This statement at least intimates that
an isolated act may be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction if the cause
of action is based on activities occurring within the state. However,
in view of the conflicting dicta, the opinion did not make it clear
whether the police-power doctrine was a limitation on the power of
a state to assert jurisdiction based on a single transaction.
The Court then turned to the facts of International Shoe and held
that Washington could validly assert personal jurisdiction. The
Court emphasized the continuous and systematic activity of the
defendant corporation over a period of years and the fact that there
had been a continuous flow of defendant's goods into the state.
Reasoning that while defendant was engaging in this activity it
received the benefit and protection of the laws of the state of Wash-
ington and that since the obligation sued on arose out of activities
occurring within the state, the Court held that: it was not unreasona-
ble to allow the maintenance of the suit.
Justice Black, while concurring in the result, sharply dissented
21. Id. at 319.
22. Id. at 318.
23. See Cleary and Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois
Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 599, 606 (1955).
24. 326 U.S. at 317. (Emphasis added.)
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from the Court's approach by characterizing the appeal as "frivo-
lous" and "unsubstantial," and urged that it be dismissed .2  He
took the view that it is not the function of the Supreme Court to
judge the constitutionality of a state court's assertion of jurisdiction
by "any such elastic standards" :26
[A]pplication of this natural law concept, whether under the
terms 'reasonableness,' 'justice,' or 'fair play,' makes judges
the supreme arbiters of the country's laws and practices.... This
result, I believe, alters the form of government our Constitution
provides. I cannot agree.
True, the State's power is here upheld. But the rule announced
means that tomorrow's judgment may strike down a State or
Federal enactment on the ground that it does not conform to
this Court's idea of natural justice.2 7
In summary, it would appear that the test of the majority under
International Shoe involves a problem of balancing the conflicting
interests of the plaintiff against the nonresident defendant, a pro-
cedure similar to that used in applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. 2s The relevant question is whether the state has suf-
ficient contacts or ties with the occurrence so that it would not be
unreasonable or unfair to require the nonresident to defend the suit.
Such things as the nature and extent of defendant's activities, where
the obligation in question arose, the residences of the parties, the
location of witnesses and evidence, and the particular law which
will control liability are all relevant. 29
25. Id. at 322.
26. Id. at 325.
27. Id. at 326. (Emphasis added.)
28. See Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F.2d 788, 790-91 (2d Cir.
1948) ; Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. Chli. L.
Rev. 523, 524 (1949) ; Note, 5 De Paul L. Rev. 106, 110, 114 (1955). Although
the type of factors considered in both questions may be the same, the weight
given to these factors may be different. Thus when the issue is jurisdiction,
the quality and nature of defendant's activities is probably the most important
factor. However, when the issue is forum non conveniens, the "convenience"
factors such as location of witnesses and evidence will be of prime importance.
29. It should be noted that International Shoe does not require a state
to assert its maximum jurisdiction. A state may insist upon minimum con-
tacts requirements that are more stringent than those required by due process
under the federal constitution. See, e.g., Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co.,
202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838
(S.D. Cal. 1955) ; 40 Minn. L. Rev. 715 (1956). However, it appears likely
that the Minnesota Supreme Court will assert its maximum jurisdiction. In
Schilling v. Roux Distributing Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907 (1953),
the question was whether the court could assert jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation which had not qualified to do business in Minnesota. The court
stated that "since this problem involves a determination of due process under
the federal constitution, we are governed by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court." Id. at 81, 59 N.W.2d at 912. It then proceeded to apply the
test of International Shoe without making mention of any local limitation. It
thus seems quite clear that the only constitutional problem regarding the
Minnesota statute will be under the federal constitution.
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C. STATE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE
TO INTERNATIONAL SHOE
Following the decision in International Shoe, several state courts
passed on the validity of single act statutes, applying the new test of
reasonableness and fairness. Since the Minnesota statute applies
to both tort and contract cases and because the problems involved
in these two classes are not identical, separate consideration will
be given to each.
Statutes relating to tort actions.
The constitutionality of a Vermont statute, 0 which is almost
identical to Minnesota's, was challenged in 1951 in Smyth v. Twin
State Improvement Corp."' A tort action was brought against a
Massachusetts corporation which allegedly had damaged the roof of
plaintiff's home while attempting to repair it. This was the only
activity defendant had ever carried on in Vermont.
The court first discussed International Shoe and concluded that
the Supreme Court had left undecided the question of whether
isolated tortious activity is sufficient to subject a foreign corporation
to in personam jurisdiction.32 It then proceeded to apply the test of
that case by balancing the conflicting interests to determine whether
it was reasonable to allow the suit. The court noted that the tort
had occurred within Vermont and reasoned that since the corpora-
tion voluntarily elected to act within the state and received the pro-
tection of Vermont laws while carrying on its activity, it was not
unfair to require the corporation to be sued in Vermont for liability
arising out of that conduct. Furthermore, plaintiff was a resident of
Vermont and to require him to sue in a foreign jurisdiction and to
transport his witnesses there might make the cost of suit prohibitive
in many cases. In addition, in a tort action most of the witnesses will
probably be residents of Vermont and the law which governs
liability in the suit will be the law of Vermont. In regard to the
statement in International Shoe that the relative inconvenience to
the defendant is a factor, the court noted that it was quite easy for
a Massachusetts corporation to defend in a Vermont court. In the
rare case when there is a hardship on defendant, the doctrine of
30. Vt. Rev. Stat. § 1562 (1947).
31. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
32. The court quoted Internatioalz Shoe to the effect that certain
isolated acts, because of their nature and quality, may be sufficient to render
the corporation liable to suit. The court failed, however, to discuss the fact
that the cases cited in support of this statement were all based on the police-
power concept.
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forum non conveniens may be applied. Accordingly, the court held
that it had jurisdiction.
One objection to the decision in Smyth is that it may place an
unduly heavy financial burden on a foreign corporation which carries
on occasional activities in several states.8s A second objection is that
it may place the corporation at the mercy of plaintiffs who file
spurious claims for moderate amounts. Thus, it might be cheaper for
the defendant to pay the spurious claim than to defend the suit in a
local court.84 This latter objection could be remedied in Minnesota
by an amendment to the statute allowing defendant to recover his
traveling expenses as part of costs, and requiring plaintiff to post a
suitable bond to cover these costs.38 The bond should be set at a
reasonable figure so as not to be unfair to the plaintiff.86
Even without such an amendment, the factors listed by the court
in the Smyth case appear to outweigh the potential disadvantages
and the case seems to be a sound application of the doctrine of Inter-
nationat Shoe." It may be just as great a financial burden for the
plaintiff to prosecute a foreign suit as for the defendant to defend
a local one. If jurisdiction is denied there is the possibility that some
corporations may refuse to pay legitimate claims because they know
it will not be worthwhile for a plaintiff to sue in a foreign court.
The reasons given by the court in Smyth in support of its deci-
sion will be equally applicable in a tort action under the Minnesota
isolated act statute. Like the Vermont statute, the Minnesota act is
limited to Minnesota residents and to causes of action arising out
of torts committed within the state. Minnesota also follows the
traditional conflicts of law rule for torts, that the law of the place of
injury determines liability.8s Since 1954 Minnesota has recognized
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.8 9
Although the suit in Smyth was in tort, its basis was a business
transaction. This raises the question of whether a state may assert
jurisdiction based on a non-business, isolated tort. It has been
suggested that in this situation, and absent the "exceptional circum-
33. See 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 598, 601 (1952).
34. Ibid.
35. See 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1026, 1028 (1956). A similar amendment was
suggested for the Illinois single act statute.
36. It might also be desirable to give the court the discretion to waive
the bond in hardship cases where plaintiff is financially unable to meet the
bond requirements, and can convince the court that its claim is not "spurious."
37. The Smyth case received widespread comment, most of which was
favorable. See, e.g., 36 Minn. L. Rev. 264 (1952) ; 37 Cornell L. Q. 458 (1952).
But see 27 Notre Dame Law. 117 (1951) ; 26 St John's L. Rev. 166 (1951).
38. Nepstad v. Lambert, 235 Minn. 1, 50 N.W.2d 614 (1951).




stance" type of case such as Hess, the single contact is not enough
to make the assumption of local jurisdiction reasonable under the
doctrine of International Shoe.40 Where the transaction does involve
business activity a stronger argument can. be made for asserting
jurisdiction, since the cost of defending a local suit may be con-
sidered as merely a legitimate expense of furthering the business
interest."" However, it is doubtful if this factor is of such importance
that it alone should prevent a court from validly asserting jurisdic-
tion. Under the test of International Shoe the emphasis is no longer
on what constitutes "doing business" but rather on adjudging the
activity carried on in relation to the purpose for which it is sought
to assert jurisdiction.4 2 Under this test the presence or absence of
business activity should be merely one factor to be considered and
should not be controlling.48
Some constitutional difficulties may be encountered in applying
the broad language of the Minnesota and Vermont statutes which'
provide that a court may assume jurisdiction if a tort is committed
"in whole or in part" within the state.4 4 Thus, the statute could
apply when the causal factors of the injury occur outstate but the
injury occurs within the forum. This situation was present in Put-
zam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.45 North Carolina has a statute
which provides that foreign corporations, though not doing business
in the state, are subject to suit on claims arising from a sale of goods
no matter where consummated, if the seller had reasonable expecta-
tion that the goods would be used in that state and if the goods were,
in fact, so used.48 A libel action was brought under this statute
against a Delaware corporation whose magazines were sold within
North Carolina by independent distributors. Defendant's other
activities within the state consisted of occasionally sending an agent
to discuss circulation figures with the North Carolina distributors,
and soliciting subscriptions from without the state by mail and by
40. See 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 598, 601 (1952).
41. Ibid.
42. See Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 18, at 209-16.
43. judge Goodrich takes the position that the presence or absence of
business activity is immaterial. See Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 18. However,
there is a statement in a recent United States Stpreme Court decision which
indicates that this factor may be given considerable weight. In McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Court stated that
"modern transportation and communication have made it much less burden-
some for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity." Id. at 223. (Emphasis added.) For a full discussion of
this case see text at notes 58-65, infra.
44. Minn. Stat Ann. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1957) ; Vt. Rev. Stat. § 1562
(1947) (Emphasis added.)
45. 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
46. N.C. Gen. Stat. 55-145(a), (a) (3) (Supp. 1955).
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means of coupons attached to the magazines. Admitting that the case
fell within the language of the statute, the court held that to assert
jurisdiction would be a denial of due process. The court reasoned
that the occasibnal visits of defendant's sales representatives were
not sufficiently substantial contacts to meet the requirements of
International Shoe.
Unlike the court in Smyth, the North Carolina court apparently
made no attempt to consider all the relevant factors bearing on
the issue of whether it was reasonable to allow the suit. The court
did not mention that in a libel action brought by a resident of North
Carolina, many of the witnesses will probably be found within that
state, and that the law of North Carolina would probably control
liability. Further, since defendant voluntarily elected to have his
magazines sold in North Carolina, it does not seem unfair to require
him to defend a local suit for liability arising out of his publications.47
Thus the court probably could have asserted jurisdiction under
International Shoe. In comparing the Putnam and Smyth decisions,
both the analysis and result reached by the court in Smyth seem
more consistent with the International Shoe doctrine.48
From the above examples, it can easily be seen that no categorical
answer to the question of the constitutionality of a single act statute
in tort actions can be given. The courts will have to determine for
each of the various types of torts what contacts are sufficient to
meet the test of International Shoe. Although there may be situa-
tions where an application of the statute violates due process, this
will probably be rare and in the great majority of cases the statute
may constitutionally be applied.
Statutes relating to contract cases.
The leading case regarding the applicability of single act statutes
to contract actions is a Maryland decision, Compania de Astral, S.A.
v. Boston Metals Co.49 A Maryland statute provides:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State
by a resident of this State or by a person having a usual place of
47. The decision in Putnam is criticized in 71 Harv. L. Rev. 554 (1958).
For an approval, see 26 Fordham L. Rev. 342 (1957).
48. In a subsequent North Carolina decision, Painter v. Home Finance
Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957), another section of the North Caro-
lina statute providing that a foreign corporation may be sued on any cause of
action arising out of tortious conduct in the state, whether arising out of re-
peated activity or single acts, was held constitutional in an action for invasion
of privacy and wrongful conversion. The activities of the defendant corpora-
tion in Painter were probably no more substantial than those of the defendant
in Putman. It thus might be possible to explain the decision in Putinan on the
ground of the courts' traditional mistrust of libel actions.
49. 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
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business in this State on any cause of action arising out of a
contract made within this State. . . whether or not such foreign
corporation is doing or has done business in this State. 0
An action for breach of contract for the sale of three ships was
brought against a Panamanian corporation which had its principal
place of business in Panama. The corporation's only contacts with
Maryland pertained to the contract in issue. These contacts were
that the three ships involved had been located in Maryland for
several years; defendant's agent had come to Maryland to inspect
the ships and part of the negotiations had tal:en place in Maryland;
a provision of the contract was that the substantive law of Maryland
should control the interpretation of the contract in the event of a
dispute; plaintiff was a resident of Maryland; an escrow fund had
been set up within the state; and the place of performance of the
contract was in Maryland.
Applying the test of International Shoe, the court held that it
had jurisdiction. It noted that although there was only a single
transaction involved, the defendant had considerable contact with the
state. It expressly rejected defendant's argument that a court could
assume jurisdiction based on isolated acts only in the "exceptional
circumstance" type case.5 '
In view of the substantial contacts involved in Compania de
Astral, the court seems to have properly concluded that it had
jurisdiction under International Shoe.5 2 Probably considerably less
contacts would have been enough to satisfy due process.53 A strong
argument can be made that even if the only contact is that the state
50. Md. Ann. Code, art. 23, § 88(d) (1951).
51. The validity of the Maryland statute was also upheld in Johns v.
Bay State Abrasive Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950), although the action
against a co-defendant was dismissed. In a federal district court decision prior
to Intermational Shoe, the court discussed the Maryland statute and stated:
"[I]t is difficult to see how the broad provisions in the Maryland law...
can be upheld, in the face of the requirements for due process,.. . ." Edgewater
Realty Co. v. Tennessee Coal, I.R. Co., 49 F. Supp. 80, 816 (D. Md. 1943)
(dictum).
52. For a criticism of the Compania de Astral case, see 40 Va. L. Rev.
1083 (1954).
53. See S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954),
where the defendant, a New York corporation, sold a machine to plaintiff
through an independent broker. The order was accepted in New York and
delivery made f.o.b. the carrier there, so the contract was technically both
"made" and "performed" in New York. Defendant's only other acts were to
recommend the manner of installation and to send a representative to in-
vestigate after the machine had caused a fire. The court upheld service of
process made under a statute providing that the foreign corporation must be
"doing business" within the state. The contacts of the defendant in Howes
were thus considerably less than those of the de-fendant in Compania de
Astral. It is interesting to note that the decision in Howes was reached with-
out the aid of a single act statute, but merely by giving a liberal construction
to the phrase "doing business."
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is the place of performance, it is sufficient to allow the assertion of
jurisdiction. 54 This would be true even though in contract cases the
witnesses and evidence may just as likely be located in another
state5 and the conflicts of law rule followed may not always permit
the law of the forum to govern liability.56 Despite these factors, if a
nonresident receives the protection of the laws of a state while he is
engaged in certain activity, it does not seem unfair to subject him to
suit for liability arising out of those activities.
It is possible that a literal application of the Minnesota statute
could result in a denial of due process in some cases. This statute
provides that a court may assume jurisdiction if the contract is "to
be performed in whole or in part... in Minnesota.1 57 Suppose that
a contract is "made" in another state, negotiations were conducted in
that state, all the witnesses and evidence are in that state, and the
major part of the contract is to be performed in that state. Minne-
sota's only contact is that certain goods are to be delivered f.o.b. the
carrier within Minnesota. Technically, the contract is being per-
formed in part within Minnesota and the court could assert juris-
diction under the statute. However, this should probably constitute a
denial of due process. The constitutional question of jurisdiction
should not depend on a technical meaning of "place of performance"
but should be determined by analyzing all of the defendant's con-
tacts to see if it would be unfair to require him to defend a local
suit. Of course, the above situation is an extreme example, and
where there is any substantial performance of the contract in Min-
nesota, the statute may probably be constitutionally applied.
D. McGEE V. INTERNATIONAL LIFE INS. Co.
The most recent development relevant to the constitutionality of
the Minnesota statute occurred in December of 1957, when the
United States Supreme Court decided the case of McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co.5" In that case plaintiff was a resident of Cali-
fornia and the beneficiary of a life insurance policy which had
originally been issued by an Arizona corporation. Defendant, a
Texas corporation, had agreed to assume the insurance obligations
54. See McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: Actions
Arising Out of Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 331, 336
(1946).
55. See Note, 43 Va. L. Rev. 1105, 1116 (1957).
56. In Minnesota, the rule is that the intent of the parties determines the
applicable law. In the absence of evidence of any intent, the law of the state
where the contract is "made" controls. The place of making is where the last
act necessary to give validity to the contract is performed. See Combined Ins.
Co. v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458, 77 N.W.2d 533 (1956).
57. Minn. Stat Ann. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
58. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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of the Arizona company and had issued a reinsurance certificate
to the insured. From 1950 until his death the insured paid the
premiums by mail from his California home to defendant's office in
Texas. When the insured died the defendant refused to make pay-
ment under the policy on the ground that the insured had com-
mitted suicide. Other than the policy in question neither defendant
nor the Arizona corporation had solicited or done any insurance
business in California. Plaintiff sued in a California state court
under a statute providing a method of substituted service on non-
resident insurance companies.59 A default judgment was entered
and suit was brought on this judgment in a Texas court. The Texas
court refused to give the judgment full faith and credit on the
ground that the California court lacked jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Supreme Court first noted that in a continuing
process of evolution it had abandoned the concepts of "consent,"
"doing business," and "presence" as proper bases of jurisdiction. It
stated that there was a clearly discernible trend toward expanding
the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations
and other nonresidents. This has not resulted in unfairness because
"modern transportation and communication have made it much less
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where
he engages in economic activity." 60
The Court then held that due process did not prevent the Cali-
fornia court from asserting jurisdiction. On its face the holding does
not appear to be particularly important in determining the constitu-
tionality of single act statutes because insurance cases have been
regarded as falling under the "exceptional circumstance" type of
case such as Hess and Doherty.61 The interesting part of the McGee
opinion involves the reasons given by the Court in support of its
decision and the cases cited. After holding that there was no denial
of due process, the Court stated: "It is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with that State." 62 In support of this statement the Court
cited three Supreme Court cases, Hess, Doherty, and Pennoyer v.
Neff.6" In addition, both the Smyth and Compania de Astral cases
were cited with approval although they were not discussed.6 '
59. Cal. Ins. Code Ann., § 1610-20 (West 1955).
60. 355 U.S. at 223.
61. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950);
Parrnalee v. Iowa State Travelers Men's Ass'n, 206 F2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953),
cert. dentied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953). For a complete discussion of the insurance
cases, see Note, 39 Va. L. Rev. 966 (1953).
62. 355 U.S. at 223.
63. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
64. 355 U.S. at 223, n. 2.
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The Court then proceeded to list the contacts which it considered
substantial enough to subject this defendant to jurisdiction. It noted
that California had a strong interest in providing effective remedies
for its residents against foreign insurance companies. It mentioned
that the contract was delivered in California, the premiums were
mailed from there and the insured was a resident of that state when
he died. The Court reasoned that it would be unfair to residents
of California to force them to sue in foreign jurisdictions since in the
case of small claims it would not be worthwhile to prosecute them,
thus making the foreign company in effect judgment proof. Lastly,
the witnesses in the case will often be located in the forum state.
With the exception of the state's interest in regulating insurance
transactions, each of the reasons given by the Court will be equally
applicable in any contract action, regardless of whether it is based
on the type of activity which the state has an interest in controlling.
This seems to be an indication that the police-power concept is not
a limitation on the jurisdiction of a state over isolated transactions.
The decision in McGee is an important step in the development
and clarification of the due process test set forth in International
Shoe. The relatively minor and isolated type of contacts which
the Court felt were sufficient to meet the test of due process marks
the furthest extension of International Shoe to date. The case may
also be interpreted to mean that the police-power concept is not a
limitation on the assertion of jurisdiction over isolated acts. In view
of these factors, and the Court's approval of the Smyth and Corn-
pania de Astral cases, the decision leaves little doubt as to the
constitutionality of the Minnesota statute as applied in most cir-
cumstances.
Conceivably a more extreme view can be taken of the scope of
the holding in McGee. It is at least arguable that as a result of
McGee there is now almost no constitutional limitation on a state
court's assertion of jurisdiction, and that Justice Black's position in
International Shoe has prevailed. The opinion itself gives no clear
indication of such a result, but in view of the almost complete lack
of contacts in McGee it is difficult to imagine a situation where the
contacts would be so slight as to constitute a denial of due process
if jurisdiction were asserted.6 5 Of course if this interpretation of
65. A recent federal district court decision is even more extreme than
McGee. In Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 26 U.S.L. Week
2385 (E.D. La. Jan. 22, 1958), suit was brought against a foreign insurance
company under Louisiana's direct-action statute. The insured was not a resi-
dent of Louisiana and the defendant's only contact with the state was that
the accident in which the insured was involved occurred in Louisiana. Relying




McGee is correct, it is an even stronger argument in favor of the
constitutionality of the Minnesota statute.
E. NOTICE PROVISIONS
Even though a state may have the power to render a judgment
against an absent defendant, due process still requires that he be
given fair notice of the proceedings against him.66 Actual notice is
not required and the procedure used need only be reasonably cal-
culated to give actual notice.6 7
The Minnesota statute provides that notice shall be given in the
following manner:
[P]rocess shall be served in duplicate upon the secretary of
state ... [who] shall mail one copy thereof to the corporation
at its last known address, and the corporation shall have 20
days within which to answer from the date of such mailing, not-
withstanding any other provision of the laws."
In Hess v. Pawloski69 the United States Supreme Court upheld
a Massachusetts statute which provided that notice could be given
defendant by mail.70 However, the statute expressly provided that
registered mail was to be used and that the defendant must sign
a return receipt. The Minnesota statute merely uses the word
"mail." Probably even the use of "ordinary" mail would be reason-
ably calculated to give actual notice and would meet the require-
ments of due process, 71 although this is not entirely clear.
72
Apart from the question of constitutionality, a requirement for
registered mail with return receipt would be a far better procedure
than that provided by the Minnesota act. If defendant refused to
acknowledge receipt for the process, this of course would be
sufficient 78 if reasonable effort was made to reach him. Both West
66. See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). On this subject
generally, see Cleary, Service of Process for Persoil Judgments, 37 Ill. Bar.
J. 236, 242-43 (1949) ; comment, 18 Calif. L. Rev. 195 (1930).
67. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
276 U.S. 13 (1928).
68. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1957).
69. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
70. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90, § 3A (1954).
71. See Wagenberg v. Charleston Wood Products, 122 F. Supp. 745
(E.D.S.C. 1954) ; Schilling v. Odlebak, 177 Minn. 90, 224 N.W. 694 (1929);
State cx rel. Cronkhite v. Belden, 193 Wis. 145, 211 N.W. 916 (1927).
72. See Freedman v. Poirier, 134 Misc. 253, 236 N.Y.S. 96 (1929),
where the court refused to give full faith and credit to a Connecticut judg-
ment even though notice was given by registered mail. The court apparently
felt that due process required a return receipt. But se.? Hartley v. Vitiello, 113
Conn. 74, 154 Atl. 255 (1931), where an opposite result was reached regarding
the same statute.
73. See W.Va. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 20, art. 1, § 71.
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Virginia and North Carolina make provision for service by regis-
tered mail in their single act statutes.7 4 Illinois goes even further
and requires that there be personal service on the nonresident de-
fendant.75 Now that the constitutional protections of due process
afforded an absent defendant have been substantially lessened, it is
even more important to insure that the procedure for notice be the
best available.
II. PARTNERSHIPS AND INDIVIDUALS
The Minnesota isolated act statute makes no provision for serv-
ice on nonresident partnerships or individuals. This raises the ques-
tion of whether a statute making such provisions would be constitu-
tional and if so, whether it would be desirable.
The decision in International Shoe involved only a corporation
and thus the case did not make it clear whether its holding also
applied to partnerships and individuals. 7 6 However, there are certain
indications in the opinion that it was meant to apply to all defend-
ants.7 7 The test of due process was set forth without specific
reference to corporations :7s
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam .... 71
Later in the opinion the Court made specific reference to natural
persons when it stated that the due process clause "does not contem-
plate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against
an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations."' ' 0 Moreover, in the McGee case the
Court gave a further indication that the test under International
Shoe is not limited to corporations when it stated:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly
discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents."'
The conclusion that International Shoe applies to all defendants
has received almost unanimous support from the writers.8 2 The
74. N.C. Gen. Stat § 55-146 (Supp. 1955); W.Va. Sess. Laws 1957,
c. 20, art. 1, § 71.
75. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 110, § 17(1) (Smith-Hurd 1956).
76. See Foster, supra note 5, at 544.
77. Id. at 545.
78. See Note, 45 Calif. L. Rev. 93, 96 (1957).
79. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
(Emphasis added.)
80. Id. at 319. (Emphasis added.)
81. 355 U.S. at 222. (Emphasis added.)
82. See, e.g., Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 100 (2d ed. 1951) ; 54 Mich.
L. Rev. 1026, 1027 (1956).
[Vol. 42:909
NOTE
case law in the state courts is also following this conclusion, 83 and
the Illinois single act statute expressly provides that it applies to non-
resident persons and partnerships as well as corporations.84
There does not appear to be any sound policy reason for holding
that the test for due process should vary depending on the type of
"person" involved. 5 The only argument that may be advanced in
support of such a result is based on an early United States Supreme
Court case. In Flexner v. Farson,86 the Court refused to apply the
"implied consent" theory used as a basis for jurisdiction over corpo-
rations to nonresident partnerships. The Court reasoned that unlike
the case of a corporation, a state may not lawfully prevent a partner-
ship or individual from doing business within its boundaries. Since
the basis for implying consent was not present, there was no juris-
diction. The authority of Flexner was greatly weakened by the
decision in Doherty & Co. v. Goodman.87 Further, the reasoning of
the Court in Flexner was purely conceptual. Now that the Supreme
Court has expressly abandoned the "consent" theory as a proper
basis for jurisdiction, there seems to be no reason to follow the
Flexner rule.
A Minnesota statute providing for service on partnerships and
individuals would be extremely desirable. However, until such
time as legislative action is taken, it is possibe that a statute origi-
nally passed in 1947 may provide an excellent interim solution for
partnerships. This statute provides:
The transaction of any acts, business or activities within the
State of Minnesota by any officer, agent, representative, em-
ployee or member of any Union or other groups or associations
. . . shall be deemed an appointment by such union or other
groups or associations of the secretary of state of... Minnesota
to be the true and lawful attorney of such union or other groups
or associations, upon whom may be served all legal processes or
other notices in any action or proceeding against or involving
said union or other groups or associations growing out of such
acts, business or activities within the State of Minnesota result-
ing in damage or loss to person or property or giving rise to any
cause of action under the laws of [Minnesota] .... 8 s
The statute appears to be aimed primarily at service on labor
unions. However, in Minnesota Wood Specialties, Inc. v. George
83. See e g Lewis Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 245,
295 P2d 14 9 (I9R6); McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union, 36 Tenn. App.
236, 254 S.W. 2d 1 (1952).
84. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 110, § 17(1) (Smith-Hurd 1956).
85. See Foster, supra note 5, at 45.
86. 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
87. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
88. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 540.152 (Supp. 1957).
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S. May Co.,s ° a federal district court construed it to allow service
on a nonresident partnership. The court noted that the statute was
rather ambiguous but felt that the use of the word "or" in the
phrase "other groups or associations," plus the fact that the Uniform
Partnership Act defines a partnership as "an association of two
or more persons," 90 made it logically tenable that the legislature
intended to include partnerships within the phrase "other groups
or associations."
The legislative history regarding this statute is extremely
sketchy. This much, however, may be determined. The bill as
originally introduced contained only the word "unions." 91 The
phrase "or other groups or associations" was added in a subsequent
amendment without any indication as to the reason for the change.
The only recorded discussion of the bill is found in the minutes of
the House Judiciary Committee.9 2 No mention was made of part-
nerships and the only questions considered were in regard to labor
unions. 98
Probably the question of applicability of the bill to partnerships
was never considered. In using the words "or other groups or asso-
ciations" the authors may have been aiming at nonresident labor
organizations which might not technically be classified as unions."
It is also possible that the words were designed to apply to non-
resident employer organizations. This, however, is mere specula-
tion and the language of the act is certainly broad enough to include
partnerships. In view of this language and in the absence of any
definite indication of legislative intent, the decision in the May case
seems justifiable.
There is also a possibility that the statute may be broad enough
to apply to the single act situation. At first glance the words "trans-
action of any acts, business or activities," because of the plural terms,
would indicate that there must be a series of acts similar to the con-
cept of "doing business" before a court could validly assert juris-
diction under the statute.9 5 However, in Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill
Mut. Ins. Co.," the New York Supreme Court in facing a similar
89. 117 F. Supp. 601 (D. Minn. 1954).
90. Minn. Stat. § 323.02(8) (1953).
91. Journal of the Senate 1026 (1947).
92. House judiciary Record 52 (1947).
93. Ibid.
94. An example might be an association of labor unions or a "labor
council"
95. This is the conclusion reached by Professor Wright. See Wright,
Minnesota Rules 22 (1954).
96. 281 App. Div. 487, 120 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1st Dep't 1953).
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problem reached a different conclusion. The court had to construe
a statute which provided:
Any of the following acts in this state... (1) the issuance or
delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of this state or to
corporations authorized to do business therein, (2) the solicita-
tion of applications for such contracts, (3) the collection of
premiums, membership fees, assessments or other considerations
for such contracts, or (4) any other transaction of business, is
equivalent to and shall constitute an appointment by such insurer
of the superintendent... to be its true and lawful attorney, upon
whom may be served all lawful process .... 17
The court rejected the contention that the statute did not apply
to the single act because of the use of plural terms in referring to
the delivery of "contracts," to "residents," and the collection of
"premiums" for "such contracts." It felt that the word "any" in the
opening phrase of the statute signified a singular act falling within
the categories stated in plural terms. The court noted that this
was a rather common mode of legislative expression.
A similar construction could be used to bring the single act
within the meaning of the Minnesota statute. The word "any" could
be held to refer to a singular act falling within the categories of
"acts," "business," or "activities." Such a construction would be of
great value since, as brought out previously, there are no policy
reasons nor apparently any constitutional restrictions to prevent a
state from asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident partnership.
III. SuMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Within the last four years Minnesota has taken two important
steps regarding the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions. The adoption of the single act statute provides an effective
remedy for Minnesota residents against foreign corporations for
liability arising out of activities of the corporation occurring within
Minnesota. The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. is a strong indication that
the Minnesota statute as applied in most situations will meet the
constitutional requirements of due process.
The second development was the recognition of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens by the Minnesota Supreme Court. This
doctrine is a necessary supplement to the isolated act statute since it
gives assurance to foreign corporations against unreasonable suit in
this state.
97. N.Y. Ins. Law § 59-a(2) (a).
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Several desirable changes, however, could still be made. A
statute should be passed to cover individuals and partnerships as
well as corporations. Until this change is made, a liberal construc-
tion of Minn. Stat. Ann. 540.152 (Supp. 1957) could accomplish
the same result for partnerships. The procedure for notice should
also be changed to expressly provide that registered mail with a
return receipt is to be used. This will insure that a defendant will
receive notice of a pending action. Lastly, a provision should be
inserted allowing a court to assess defendant's travel expenses as
part of costs, and plaintiff should be required to post a suitable bond
to cover these costs. This will eliminate the objection to the statute
that residents may file spurious claims for small amounts in the hope
that the corporation will pay them rather than incur the cost of
defending a local suit. If these changes are made, Minnesota will
have a progressive system for obtaining jurisdiction over absent
defendants which is fair to both Minnesota plaintiffs and nonresi-
dent defendants.
